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Abstract—A coding scheme based on irregular low-density
parity-check (LDPC) codes is proposed to send secret messages
from a source over the Gaussian wiretap channel to a destination
in the presence of a wiretapper, with the restriction that the
source can send only binary phase-shift keyed (BPSK) symbols.
The secrecy performance of the proposed coding scheme is
measured by the secret message rate through the wiretap channel
as well as the equivocation rate about the message at the
wiretapper. A code search procedure is suggested to obtain
irregular LDPC codes that achieve good secrecy performance
in such context.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security provides secure communication be-
tween desired users by taking advantages of various physical
channel characteristics. The study of physical-layer security
dates back to Wyner’s seminal paper [1], in which he in-
troduced the wiretap channel model. In a wiretap channel,
a source tries to send secret information to a destination in
the presence of a wiretapper. When the wiretapper channel
is a degraded version of the destination channel, Wyner [1]
described a code design based on group codes such that
the source can transmit messages at a positive rate to the
destination. This degradedness condition was removed in [2],
which showed that a positive secrecy rate is possible for the
case where the destination channel is “less noisy” than the
wiretapper channel. Generalization of Wyner’s work to the
Gaussian wiretap channel was considered in [3]. In [4], a code
design based on coset codes was suggested for the type-II
(the destination channel is error free) binary erasure wiretap
channel. Reference [5] considered the design of secure nested
codes for type-II wiretap channels. Recently, references [6]
and [7] concurrently established the result that polar codes [8]
can achieve the secrecy capacity of the degraded binary-input
symmetric-output (BISO) wiretap channels.
Low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes have emerged as
potential practical candidates for providing reliable and secure
communication over wiretap channels. First, LDPC codes
provide excellent “close-to-capacity” performance with rea-
sonable encoding/decoding complexity [9], [10], [11]. Sec-
ond, there exists powerful tools like density evolution [12]
for asymptotic analysis and code design of LDPC codes.
For example, the authors of [13] constructed LDPC based
wiretap codes for the binary erasure channel (BEC) and the
binary symmetric channel (BSC). In [14], multilevel cod-
ing/multistage decoding using LDPC codes has been proposed
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for the quasi-static Rayleigh fading wiretap channel. In [15],
punctured LDPC codes were employed in a coding scheme
that aims at reducing the security gap of the Gaussian wire-
tap channel. In [16], further reductions in the security gap
are achieved using non-systematic LDPC code obtained by
scrambling the information bits prior to LDPC encoding.
In this paper, we design LDPC codes for sending secret mes-
sages over the Gaussian wiretap channel with binary phase-
shift keyed (BPSK) source symbols. This work is inspired
by the results in [17] on secret key agreement over the same
wiretap channel, with the availability of an additional public
feedback channel. In particular, Theorem 2 of [17] can be mod-
ified to show the existence of regular LDPC code ensembles
with increasing block lengths that achieve secrecy capacity [1],
[3] of the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel. Based
on this observation, we propose a coding scheme which
employs irregular LDPC codes [18] with finite block lengths to
support practical secret transmission over the Gaussian wiretap
channel. The proposed coding structure allows efficient design
of irregular LDPC codes that give good secrecy performance
as measured in terms of equivocation about the secret message
at the wiretapper. This design constitutes the main technical
contribution of the present paper. We note that codes suggested
in [15] can be considered as unoptimized special cases of the
proposed coding scheme. A more detailed comparison will be
given in the sequel.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces
the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel. The pro-
posed coding scheme will be discussed in detail in Section III.
In Section IV, we describe a code search algorithm based on
density evolution analysis to obtain good irregular codes for
use in the proposed coding scheme. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. BPSK-CONSTRAINED GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
We consider the wiretap channel model in which the source
tries to send a secret message to the destination via an additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel in the presence of a
wiretapper. The wiretapper intends to reconstruct the message
by listening to the transmission through another independent
AWGN channel. The secret message M ∈ {1, 2 · · · , 2k} is
encoded into a transmitted sequence Xn = [X1, X2, · · · , Xn].
Let Y n and Zn denote the corresponding received sequences
at the destination and wiretapper, respectively. We restrict the
source to transmit only BPSK symbols, i.e. Xi ∈ {±1}1.
1In later sections, whenever appropriate, we implicitly employ the mapping
+1→ 0 and −1→ 1, where 0 and 1 are the two usual elements in GF(2).
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Then the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel can be
modeled as
Yi = βXi +Ni
Zi = αβXi + N˜i,
where Ni and N˜i are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) zero-mean Gaussian random variables of variance σ2.
Note that β is the gain of the BPSK symbols transmit-
ted by the source. We impose the source power constraint
1
n
∑n
j=1 |Xj |2 ≤ P such that β2 ≤ P , where P is the
maximum power available to the source. Also, α is a positive
constant that models the gain advantage of the wiretapper
over the destination. Let the (noise) normalized gain be β˜ =
β/σ, then the received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the
destination and wiretapper are β˜2 and α2β˜2, respectively.
Assuming a uniform message distribution, the rate of the
secret message is Rs = kn . Let Mˆ denote the estimate
of the message at the destination. The level of knowledge
of the wiretapper possesses about the secret message can
be quantified by the equivocation rate 1nH(M |Zn). A rate-
equivocation pair (Rs, Re) is achievable if for all  > 0, there
exists a rate-Rs code sequence such that
1) Pr{M 6= Mˆ} < , and
2) Re < 1nH(M |Zn) + 
for sufficiently large n. When the equivocation rate at the
wiretapper is as large as the secret message rate, i.e. Rs = Re,
we say that the equivocation-rate pair is achievable with
perfect secrecy [1]. The capacity-equivocation region of a
wiretap channel contains all achievable rate-equivocation pairs
(Rs, Re). When α ≤ 1, specializing the result in [2] shows
that the capacity-equivocation region of the BPSK-constrained
Gaussian wiretap channel is given by
0 ≤ Re ≤ Cb
Re ≤ Rs ≤ C
(√
P
σ2
)
, (1)
where
Cb = max
0≤β˜≤
√
P
σ2
{
C(β˜)− C(αβ˜)
}
, (2)
and
C(t) = 1− 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
(y−t)2
2 log2
(
e−2yt
)
dy
is the channel capacity of AWGN channel with BPSK input.
The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is defined as
the maximum secret message rate such that the condition
of perfect secrecy is satisfied. For the BPSK-constrained
Gaussian wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity is given by
Cb if α ≤ 1.
We note that Cb is achieved when Xi is equiprobable;
but it is not necessarily achieved by transmitting at the
maximum allowable power P . Fig. 1 shows the plot of Cb,
in units of bits per (wiretap) channel use (bpcu), versus the
maximum allowable SNR P/σ2 for α2 = −1.0,−2.5,−4.4,
and −4.7 dB, respectively.
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Fig. 1. The secrecy capacity Cb of the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap
channel for different value of α2.
III. SECRET LDPC CODING SCHEME
In this section, we describe the proposed coding scheme
for the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel. Inspired
by our previous work [17] on secret key agreement over the
same wiretap channel, the proposed coding scheme employs
irregular LDPC codes and its secrecy performance will be
evaluated by measuring the equivocation rate of the secret
message at the wiretapper.
Similar to [17], we start with an (n, l, k) secret binary linear
block code defined by the pair (C,W), where C is an (n, l)
binary linear block code with 2l distinct codewords of length
n and W is an (l− k)-dimensional subspace in C. The ratios
Rc =
l
n and Rs =
k
n will be referred to as the code rate
and secret rate of (C,W), respectively. The pair (C,W) will
be employed to support practical secret transmission over the
wiretap channel. We take the following considerations into
account when choosing (C,W). First, the choice of (C,W)
should admit efficient encoder and decoder in order to make
the proposed coding scheme practically implementable. Sec-
ond, the choice of (C,W) should avoid transmitting the secret
message M “directly” through the channel since such “direct”
transmission is undesirable. Third, the choice of (C,W) should
permit a design procedure based on which “good” codes can
be obtained.
To satisfy these considerations, we choose an (m, l) linear
block code C′ from an ensemble of irregular LDPC codes,
where m = n + k. Then the pair (C,W) is chosen as
follows. Let H be the parity-check matrix associated with C′
and assume H = [A,B] where B is an (m − l)× (m − l)
lower triangular matrix2. Let X˜m = [ck, dl−k, em−l] where
em−l = [ck, dl−k]AT (B−1)T denote a codeword of C′. Then
the (n, l) linear block code C is chosen to be set of codewords
2This lower triangular matrix can be obtained through performing Gaussian
elimination. If efficient encoding is necessary, an approximate lower triangular
matrix as described in [11] can be used instead.
obtained by removing ck from X˜m. That is, C is a punctured
version of C′. The subspace W is chosen to be the subset
of (punctured) codewords obtained by setting ck to zero. The
coding scheme employing the pair (C,W) is as follows:
1) Encoding: The source sets ck to be the k-bits se-
cret message M and chooses dl−k randomly according
to a uniform distribution. Then it calculates em−l =
[ck, dl−k]AT (B−1)T and sends Xn = [dl−k, em−l] to
the destination through the Gaussian wiretap channel.
2) Decoding: The destination performs belief propagation
(BP) decoding to decode X˜m using its channel observa-
tion Y n. The first k bits of the decoded codeword give
the estimate Mˆ of the secret message.
We evaluate the secrecy performance of the proposed coding
scheme in the context of achievable rate-equivocation pair
defined in Section II. First, if the BP decoder at the destination
achieves error probability d, then we have Pr{M 6= Mˆ} ≤
d. Hence, Condition 1 in Section II is satisfied if d is small
enough. Second, the uncertainty about the message M at the
wiretapper given his received sequence Zn is
H(M |Zn)
= H(Xn|Zn) +H(M |Zn, Xn)−H(Xn|M,Zn)
= H(Xn)− I(Xn;Zn) +H(M |Zn, Xn)−
H(Xn|M,Zn). (3)
Based on the memoryless nature of the source-to-wiretapper
channel and the encoding process, we have I(Xn;Zn) ≤
nC(αβ˜), H(Xn) = l 3 and H(M |Zn, Xn) ≤ H(M |Xn) =
0, respectively. Moreover, consider a fictitious receiver at the
wiretapper trying to decode for Xn from observing Zn and
M . Suppose that the average error probability achieved by this
receiver is w. Then we have H(Xn|M,Zn) ≤ 1+ (l− k)w
by Fano’s inequality. Putting all these back to (3), we obtain
1
n
H(M |Zn) ≥ Rc − C(αβ˜)− (Rc −Rs)w − 1
n
. (4)
Let Re = Rc − C(αβ˜), then Condition 2 in Section II is
satisfied if w is small enough and n is large enough. Hence,
(Rs, Re) is an achievable rate-equivocation pair through the
BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel. Moreover, we
note that the above lower bound is derived from the Fano’s
inequality; thus it applies to any decoder at the fictitious
receiver. In fact, the value of the bound depends on the choice
of decoders only through w. In the next section, we perform
computer simulation to estimate w and then employ (4) to
bound the equivocation rate achieved by the proposed coding
scheme as described above. To get w, a BP decoder is
implemented for the fictitious receiver at the wiretapper. In
order to provide information about the secret message M to
the BP decoder, the intrinsic log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) of
ck are explicitly set to ±∞ according to the true bit values.
3This is valid when C contains 2l distinct codewords, which is in turn the
case with very high probability if C′ is chosen randomly in the usual manner
described in [18].
IV. CODES DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE
As mentioned in Section I, reference [15] uses a systematic
irregular LDPC code to encode the secret message M (along
with some random bits) and then punctures the secret message
bits in the codeword prior to transmission in order to “hide” the
secret message from the wiretapper. The puncturing pattern is
designed to minimize the security gap. Such a coding scheme
can be viewed as an unoptimized special case of our scheme
proposed in Section III. We show in this section that the gen-
eralization in Section III allows us to systematically optimize
the irregular LDPC code for good secrecy performance.
To that end, let us apply the code search process proposed
in [17] to the present case. Our objective is to design the
irregular LDPC code C′ and a puncturing scheme so that the
secret LDPC code (C,W) works well for both the channel
from the source to the destination and the channel from the
source to the wiretapper (given the secret message). Let us first
consider uniform puncturing of the systematic bits of C′, with
p denoting the corresponding fraction of punctured variable
nodes. Note that the secret rate Rs = p1−p . Also, write the
rate of C′ as R′c = lm . Then R′c = Rc1+Rs . For any fixed Rs,
the discussion just below (4) at the end of the previous section
suggests that we should maximize Rc, or equivalently R′c, in
order to maximize the achievable equivocation rate.
Express the variable- and check-node degree distribution
polynomials of C′ as, respectively, λ(x) = ∑dvi=2 λixi−1 and
ρ(x) =
∑dc
i=2 ρix
i−1, where λi(ρi) represents the fraction of
edges emanating from the variable (check) nodes of degree i
and dv (dc) is the maximum variable (check) degree. For a
fixed value of Rs (which in turn fixes p), the design objective
is to then find λ(x) and ρ(x) that maximize the code rate
R′c = 1 −
∫
ρ(x)dx∫
λ(x)dx
subject to the constraint that both d and
w vanish as the BP decoders iterate.
Fix ρ(x), and let ed(`) and ew(`) denote the bit error
probabilities obtained by the BP decoders at the destination
and wiretapper, respectively, at the `th density evolution iter-
ation [12], [19] when an initial λ˜(x) =
∑dv
i=2 λ˜ix
i−1 is used.
Now, let A`,j denote the bit error probability obtained at the
destination by running the density evolution for ` iterations,
in which λ˜(x) is used as the variable-node degree distribution
for the first ` − 1 iterations and the variable-node degree
distribution with a singleton of unit mass at degree j is used
for the final iteration. Let B`,j denote the similar quantity for
bit error probability obtained at the wiretapper. Then, we have
ed(`) =
∑dv
j=2A`,j λ˜j and ew(`) =
∑dv
j=2B`,j λ˜j . Note that
the values of A`,j and B`,j are obtained via density evolution.
To account for the puncturing of ck at the destination’s BP
decoder, the intrinsic LLR distribution entered into the density
evolution analysis for the destination’s BP decoder is set to be
a mixture of the distribution of the channel outputs at the
destination and an impulse at 0 with weights determined by
the value of p. Let  > 0 be a small prescribed error tolerance.
Suppose that λ˜(x) satisfies the property that ed(Md) ≤ 
and ew(Mw) ≤ , for some integers Md and Mw. Then,
we can frame the Rc-maximizing code design problem as the
TABLE I
DEGREE DISTRIBUTION PAIRS OF THE RATE-0.541, RATE-0.508,
RATE-0.505 IRREGULAR LDPC CODES OBTAINED FROM THE PROPOSED
CODE SEARCH PROCESS.
rate-0.541 rate-0.508 rate-0.505
λ2 0.3013 0.2762 0.2599
λ3 0.1846 0.2804 0.2837
λ4 0.1510 0.0281
λ9 0.0614
λ10 0.3017 0.4434 0.4283
ρ7 0.3892 0.6086 0.6315
ρ8 0.6054 0.3914 0.3532
ρ10 0.0054 0.0153
following linear program:
max
λ(x)
dv∑
j=2
λj
j
subject to:
dv∑
j=2
λj = 1, λi ≥ 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ dv ,∣∣∣∣∣∣
dv∑
j=2
A`,jλj − es(`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ max[0, δ(es(`− 1)− es(`))]
and
dv∑
j=2
A`,jλj ≤ es(`− 1), for 1 ≤ ` ≤Ms∣∣∣∣∣∣
dv∑
j=2
B`,jλj − ew(`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ max[0, δ(ew(`− 1)− ew(`))],
and
dv∑
j=2
B`,jλj ≤ ew(`− 1), for 1 ≤ ` ≤Mw,
where dv here is the maximum allowable degree of λ(x)
and δ is a small positive number. The solution λ(x) of the
above linear program is then employed as the initial λ˜(x)
for the next search round. The search process continues this
way until ed(Md) or ew(Mw) becomes larger than , or until
λ(x) converges. We can also fix λ(x) and obtain a similar
linear programming problem for ρ(x). The iterative search can
then alternate between the linear programs for λ(x) and ρ(x),
respectively.
For illustration, we apply the above code search procedure
to two different wiretap channel settings: (i) P/σ2 = 3.55 dB
and α2 = −4.4 dB, and (ii) P/σ2 = 1.0 dB and α2 =
−1.0 dB. In both cases, the code search process starts with the
AWGN-optimized LDPC codes reported in [18]. Fig. 2 shows
the secrecy performance of a rate-0.541 irregular LDPC code
obtained by performing the code search process with Rs =
0.33 under the first channel setting. The degree distribution
pair of this irregular LDPC code is shown in Table I. We
obtain an instance of the irregular LDPC code by randomly
generating a bipartite graph which satisfies the two given
degree distributions. The block length of the LDPC code is
n = 106, and all length-4 loops are removed. Computer
simulation is performed on this code to estimate d and w
as described before. The estimated value of w is employed to
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Fig. 2. Plot of (Rs, R˜e) pairs achieved by the proposed coding scheme and
by the coding scheme in [15] when P/σ2 = 3.55 dB and α2 = −4.4 dB.
The solid curve traces the boundary of the capacity-(fractional) equivocation
region.
calculate an achievable equivocation rate as in (4), provided
that d ≤ 0.01 and w ≤ 0.01. The resulting achievable pair
(Rs, R˜e) (where R˜e = ReRs is the fractional equivocation) is
plotted against the capacity-(fractional) equivocation region,
whose boundary is shown by the solid curve in the figure.
From Fig. 2, we see that the pair (Rs, R˜e) = (0.33, 0.89)
(shown by the square marker) is achieved by this rate-0.541
LDPC code.
Next, we consider the more challenging case under the
second channel setting, in which the wiretapper’s SNR is
not much weaker than that of the destination. Fig. 3 shows
the secrecy performance of a rate-0.505 irregular LDPC code
obtained by performing the code search process described
above with Rs = 0.076. The degree distribution pair of this
irregular LDPC code can be found in Table I. We observe
that the pair (Rs, R˜e) = (0.076, 0.76) (denoted by the square
marker) is achieved by this code. In conclusion, the code
search process described above gives irregular LDPC codes
with relatively good secrecy performance for different values
of α2. A similar code search process can also be formulated to
include optimization of the puncturing pattern. However, we
have not been able to obtain significantly better codes with
the modified search.
As mentioned before, the codes suggested in [15] are “unop-
timized” special cases of the coding scheme described here.
In particular, a rate-0.5 irregular LDPC code with p = 0.3
is employed in [15], resulting in secret rate Rs = 0.43. The
secrecy performance of the coding scheme in [15] is evaluated
by the security gap. In our notation, that is to find the values
β˜ and α such that the decoding (bit) error probability of the
secret message at the destination is smaller than a prescribed
value, and the decoding (bit) error probability of the secret
message at the wiretapper is close to 0.5. The security gap is
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Fig. 3. Plot of the (Rs, R˜e) pair achieved by the proposed coding scheme
when P/σ2 = 1.0 dB and α2 = −1.0 dB. The solid curve traces the
boundary of the capacity-(fractional) equivocation region.
then defined as the ratio of the SNR of the destination to that
of the wiretapper, i.e. 1α2 . As reported in [15], the security gap,
with uniform puncturing over all variable nodes of different
degree for p = 0.3 is about 4.4 dB.
To compare with our optimized codes, Fig. 2 shows the
secrecy performance of the rate-0.5 code in [15] with p = 0.3
evaluated by using (4) as before under channel setting (i). The
pair (Rs, R˜e) = (0.43, 0.68) (denoted by the circle marker) is
achieved by this code. We also perform a code search under
this channel setting with Rs = 0.43 for comparison. The pair
(Rs, R˜e) = (0.43, 0.70) (denoted by the diamond marker)
is achieved using the resulting rate-0.508 irregular LDPC
code. We see that the irregular LDPC code obtained from the
proposed code search process also slightly outperforms the
“unoptimized” one used in [15] in terms of equivocation rate.
Consulting back to Fig. 1, we see that for α2 = −4.4 dB,
the secrecy capacity of the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wire-
tap channel never exceeds 0.34 bpcu. Hence, the fractional
equivocation R˜e is straightly below 1 at Rs = 0.43. In fact,
the highest achievable R˜e at Rs = 0.43 under this channel
setting is only 0.78 (cf. Fig 2). That means, we should not
operate at this rate if we target to achieve perfect secrecy.
In summary, the proposed coding scheme and code search
process provide a much more systematic and flexible means
to designing irregular LDPC codes for the BPSK-constrained
wiretap channel than the approach in [15].
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we developed a coding scheme for sending
secret messages over the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap
channel. The proposed coding scheme employs punctured
systematic irregular LDPC codes in which secret message
bits are punctured. To systematically address the secret code
design problem, we presented a density-evolution based linear
program to search for good irregular LDPC codes to be used
in the proposed coding scheme. Simulation results showed
that the irregular LDPC codes obtained from our search can
achieve secrecy performance relatively close to the boundary
of the capacity-equivocation region of the BPSK-constrained
Gaussian wiretap channel.
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